Most of the previous studies concerning checking the integrity constraints in distributed database derive simplified forms of the initial integrity constraints with the sufficiency property, since the sufficient test is known to be cheaper than the complete test and its initial integrity constraint as it involves less data to be transferred across the network and can always be evaluated at the target site (single site). Their studies are limited as they depend strictly on the assumption that an update operation will be executed at a site where the relation specified in the update operation is located, which is not always true. Hence, the sufficient test, which is proven to be local test by previous study, is no longer appropriate. This paper proposes an approach to checking integrity constraints in a distributed database by utilizing as much as possible the local information stored at the target site. The proposed approach derives support tests as an alternative to the existing complete and sufficient tests proposed by previous researchers with the intention to increase the number of local checking regardless the location of the submitted update operation. Several analyses have been performed to evaluate the proposed approach, and the results show that support tests can benefit the distributed database, where local constraint checking can be achieved.
Introduction
The validity, accuracy, and semantic of data are significant requirements in modern database applications. Semantic data in database is normally represented under the form of integrity constraints. Integrity constraints are properties, typically depending on the nature of the application domain, which must always be satisfied for the data to be considered consistent. Maintaining obedience of data with respect to integrity constraints is an essential requirement, since, if some data lacks integrity, then answers to queries cannot be trusted. Databases usually contain massive collections of data that rapidly evolve over time; this makes perfect checking at each update too time-consuming a task to be feasible. In this regard, DBMS needs to be extended with the ability to automatically verify that database updates do not introduce any violation of integrity [1] . Simplification means to generate a set of integrity tests from the initial constraints whose satisfaction implies the satisfaction of the original constraints in the updated state. The main interest of the simplification process is to obtain a set of integrity tests (simplified forms) that are as easy to evaluate as possible. In this sense, simplification technique is feasible in terms of the cost of evaluating the constraints.
Checking the consistency of a database state will generally involve the execution of integrity tests on the database which verify whether the database is satisfying its constraints or not. A naïve approach is to perform the update and then check whether the integrity constraints are satisfied in the new database state. This method, termed brute force checking, is very expensive, impractical and can lead to prohibitive processing. The brute force strategy of checking constraints is worse in the distributed database context since the checking would typically require data transfer as well as computation leading to complex algorithms to determine the most efficient approach. Allowing an update to execute with the intention of aborting it at commit time in the event of constraint violation is also inefficient since rollback and recovery must occur at all sites which participated in the update [2−4] . This paper presents an approach to checking integrity constraints in distributed database by utilizing as much as possible the information stored at the target site. Our approach uses the initial integrity constraint, the update operation (template), and the other integrity constraints to simplify an integrity Regular Paper constraint and produce the support tests. The proposed approach derives support tests as an alternative to the existing complete and sufficient tests proposed by previous researchers with the intention to increase the number of local checking for a given update operation. This strategy improves the performance of the distributed database system since the checking is performed locally at the target site (utilizing the local information) or at least at a minimal number of sites.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the previous work related to this research is presented. In Section 3, the basic definitions, notation and examples, which are used in the rest of the paper, are set out. Section 4 describes our proposed simplification approach followed by some examples. In Section 5, some results are illustrated. Conclusions are presented in Section 6.
Related Work
For distributed databases, a number of researchers have looked at the problem of semantic integrity checking. Although many researches have been conducted concerning the issues of integrity constraint checking and maintaining in distributed databases but they failed to exploit the available information at the target site and explore various types of integrity tests to ensure local checking can always be achieved. This is briefly shown in Table 1 , where columns labeled 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 represent the work by [5-8, 4, 9-11] respectively.
The work presented in [5] constructed a simplification method for integrity constraints expressed in terms of assertions for central databases and extended it to distributed databases. This method produces at assertion definition time, differential pre-tests called compiled assertions, which can be used to prevent the introduction of inconsistencies in the database. The cost of integrity checking is reduced because only the data subject to update is checked in this approach.
Qian [6] argued that most approaches derive simplified forms of integrity constraints from the syntactic structure of the constraints and the update operation without exploiting knowledge about the application domain and the actual implementation of the Types of Domain
Qian [6] shows that distributed constraints can be translated into constraints on the fragments of a distributed database, given the definition of the fragmentation, and offers a framework for constraint reformulation. The constraint reformulation algorithm used to derive sufficient conditions can potentially be very inefficient because it searches through the entire space of eligible reformulation for the optimal one. Using heuristic rules to restrict the reformulation step may miss some optimal reformulation.
The work presented in [7] aims at minimizing the number of sites involved in evaluating the integrity constraints in a distributed environment. In his approach the intention is to reduce the non-locality of constraints by deriving sufficient conditions not only for the distributed integrity constraints given, but also for those arising as tests for particular transactions. His method relies on a standard backchaining approach to finding the sufficient conditions. Gupta [8] presented an algorithm to generate parameterized local tests that check whether an update operation violates a constraint. This algorithm uses the initial consistency assumption, an integrity constraint assertion that is expressed in a subset of first order logic, and the target relation to produce the local test. This optimization technique allows a global constraint to be verified by accessing data locally in a single database where the modification is made. However, this approach is only useful in situations where each site of a distributed DBMS contains one or more intact relations since it does not consider any fragmentation rules.
Ibrahim et al. [4] contributed to the solution of constraint checking in a distributed database by demonstrating when it is possible to derive from global constraints localized constraints. They have proved that examining the semantics of both the tests and the relevant update operations reduces the amount of data transferred across the network. The simplified tests have reduced the amount of data that needed to be accessed and the number of sites that might be involved. Ibrahim [9] extended the work in [4] by considering the transition constraints.
The work proposed in [10] focuses on checking global constraints involving aggregates in the presence of updates. The algorithm takes as input an update statement, a list of global constraints involving aggregates and granules. The sub-constraint granules are executed locally at remote sites and the algorithm decides if a constraint is violated based on these sub-constraint executions. The algorithm performs constraints checking before the updates and thus saves time and resources on rollback. This approach is limited as they only consider semantic integrity constraints involving both arithmetic and aggregate predicates. Other types of integrity constraints that are important and are frequently used in database applications are not being considered.
Soumya et al. [11] proposed a technique to achieve optimization of constraint checking process in distributed databases by exploiting technique of parallelism, compile time constraint checking, localized constraint checking, and history of constraint violations. The architecture mainly consists of two modules: constraint analyzer and constraint ranker for analyzing the constraints and for ranking the constraints, respectively, for systems with relational databases. They achieved optimization in terms of time by executing the constraints in parallel with mobile agents.
From these works, it can be observed that most of the previous studies proposed an approach to deriving simplified form of the initial integrity constraint with the sufficiency property, since the sufficient test is known to be cheaper than the complete test and its initial integrity constraint as it involves less data to be transferred across the network and can always be evaluated at the target site, i.e., only one site will be involved during the checking process. The previous approaches assume that an update operation will be executed at a site where the relation specified in the update operation is located, which is not always true. For example, consider a relation R that is located at site 1. An insert operation into R is assumed to be submitted by a user at site 1 and a sufficient test generated is used to validate the consistency of the database with respect to this update operation, which can be performed locally at site 1. But if the same update operation is submitted at a different site, say 2, the sufficient test is no longer appropriate as it will definitely access information from site 1 which is now remote to site 2. Therefore, an approach is needed so that local checking can be performed regardless the location of the submitted update operation. Also, the approach must be able to cater the important and frequently used integrity constraint types.
Preliminaries
Our approach has been developed in the context of relational databases. A database is described by a database schema, D, which consists of a finite set of relation schemas, R 1 , R 2 , . . . , R m . A relation schema is denoted by R(A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A n ) where R is the name of the relation (predicate) with n-arity and A i 's are the attributes of R. A relational distributed database schema is described as (D, IC, AS) where IC is a finite set of integrity constraints and AS is a finite set of allocation schemas.
Database integrity constraints are expressed in prenex conjunctive normal form with the range restricted property. A conjunct (literal) is an atomic formula of the form R(u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u k ) where R is a kary relation name and each u i is either a variable or a constant. A positive atomic formula (positive literal) is denoted by R(u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u k ) whilst a negative atomic formula (negative literal) is prefixed by ¬. An (in)equality is a formula of the form u 1 OP u 2 (prefixed with ¬ for inequality) where both u 1 and u 2 can be constants or variables and OP ∈ {<, , >, , <>, =}.
Schema : emp(eno, dno, ejob, esal); dept(dno, dname, mgrno, mgrsal); proj(eno, dno, pno)
Integrity Constraints :
Referential Integrity Constraints (IC-4) 'The dno of every tuple in the emp relation exists in the dept relation'
The eno of every tuple in the proj relation exists in the emp relation' (∀u∀v∀w∃x∃y∃z)(proj (u, v, w) → emp(u, x, y, z)) (IC-6) 'The dno of every tuple in the proj relation exists in
All managers who are working on project P 3 must earn more than 1000' (∀v∀w∀x∀y∀z)(dept(v, w, x, y) ∧ proj (x, z, P 3) → (y > 1000)) (IC-12) 'Any department that is working on a project P 1 is also working on project P 2' (∀x∀y∃z)(proj (x, y, P 1) → proj (z, y, P 2)) Throughout this paper the company database is used, as given in Fig.1 . This example has been used in most previous works related to the area of constraint checking [2, 4, 8, 12] . In the database literature, many types and variations of integrity tests have been described. One of these classifications of integrity tests are based on its properties [13] , namely: sufficient tests, necessary tests, and complete tests. These tests are defined below:
(i) sufficient tests -when the test is satisfied, this implies that the associated constraint is satisfied and thus the update operation is safe with respect to the constraint; (ii) necessary tests -when the test is not satisfied, this implies that the associated constraint is violated and thus the update operation is unsafe with respect to the constraint; (iii) complete tests -has both the sufficiency and the necessity properties.
Also, another classification of integrity tests is based on the input used to generate the test, namely: nonsupport tests and support tests. (i) Non-support tests -are generated based on the update operation and the integrity constraint to be checked; (ii) support tests -any tests that are derived using other integrity constraints as the support to generate the tests. The nonsupport tests and the support-tests can have the characteristics as mentioned above, namely: complete, sufficient, and necessary depending on the properties of the tests. The derivation of the non-support tests is limited as it only explores the relations as specified in the integrity constraint to be checked (target), hence derives integrity tests over either the target relation (relation that appears in the update operation, normally a sufficient test) or over one or more other relations as appear in the target integrity constraint (complete test). In the distributed database context, most approaches focus on the sufficient test, as it can be checked locally with the assumption that the update operation will be executed at the site where the relation specified in the update operation is located.
While the derivation of support tests aims at exploiting possible relationships between the target relation and other relations that do not appear in the specification of the target integrity constraint, we generate integrity tests over several other relations that are not covered in the target integrity constraint. This test is suitable if the update operation is executed at a site which is remote to the target relation.
Phases of the Proposed Simplification Approach
Ideally, before an integrity test can be generated for a given integrity constraint and its appropriate update operation, two phases need to be considered, namely: (i) parsing and analyzing the database schema and integrity constraints; and (ii) generating the update templates. These preprocessing phases are important as the output from these phases is required for the third and the most crucial phase, which is (iii) generating the integrity tests.
Parsing and Analyzing Database Schema and Integrity Constraints
Basically, before generating the integrity tests some important information used in the generating integrity tests is extracted in this phase. The information such as the names of relations, the names of attributes, and the number of attributes in the database schema and in the integrity constraints is extracted by analyzing the syntax of each one. The main purpose of this phase is to ensure that the names of relations and the number of attributes specified in an integrity constraint statement are consistent with the names and the number of attributes of the relations specified in the CREATE TABLE statement.
Generating Update Templates
This phase automatically generates update templates, which are then input to the next phase, generating integrity tests. The technique employed for deriving the possible update templates that might violate a given integrity constraint is based on syntactic criteria. For each integrity constraint, the appropriate update template(s) is generated by applying the well known update theorems. These theorems with their proofs can be found in [14] and are therefore omitted here.
Generating Integrity Tests
The integrity tests generating phase is to generate the tests (simplified forms) of integrity constraints. The integrity tests of integrity constraints are used to prove the safety of changes made by an update operation. The execution of the integrity tests results in an easier checking process compared to the execution of the initial integrity constraints. For each integrity constraint in this case called target integrity constraint and its appropriate update template(s) generated by the update template generation phase, integrity test(s) is derived. This test is either complete or sufficient. Support test is also derived for the target integrity constraint and its appropriate update operation using the other integrity constraints (called non-target integrity constraints) as support.
Complete tests are derived using Algorithm-1 proposed in [14] ; complete/sufficient tests are generated using Algorithm-2 proposed in [15] ; while support tests are produced using Algorithm-3 which is proposed by us. These algorithms adopt the substitution techniques and absorption rules to generate integrity tests [14, 15] . Before the steps of generating the support tests are illustrated, some notations with their intended meaning which are used in the algorithm are highlighted.
• TR : the target relation referred to by an elementary update operation.
• OR : the other relation(s) which is not TR.
• TIC : the target integrity constraint to be checked.
• TIC TR : the target relation of TIC that is referred to by an elementary update operation.
• TIC OR : the other relation of TIC which is not TR.
• TIC CA : a common attribute(s) of TR and OR of TIC, which belongs to (occurs in) both TR and OR of TIC.
• TIC P-CA-OR : the position of the common attribute based on the OR in TIC.
• OIC : the other integrity constraint which is not TIC.
• OIC TR : the target relation of OIC that is referred to by an elementary update operation.
• OIC OR : the other relation of OIC which is not TR.
• OIC CA : a common attribute(s) between the relations in OIC.
• OIC P-CA-OR : the position of the common attribute based on the OR in OIC.
• OIC : the other integrity constraint which is not TIC and OIC.
• OIC CA : a common attribute(s) of TR and OR of OIC which belongs to (occurs in) both TR and OR of OIC .
• OIC OR : the other relation of OIC which is not TR. Fig.2 shows the steps required to generate a support test for an insert or a delete operation. A modify operation is modeled by a delete operation followed by an insert operation.
The complexity of Algorithm-3 for general semantic integrity constraints is O(n 2 ), while for other type of integrity constraints considered in this paper is O(n). Now we present detailed examples for Algorithm-3, which will clarify the steps presented above. pt(a, x1, y1, z1) ).
IC-3: Update operation: insert dept(a, b, c, d)
Test-IC-3 Algorithm-1 (Complete): (∀x2∀y2∀z2)(¬de- pt(a, x2, y2, z2) ∨ [(b = x2) ∧ (c = y2) ∧ (d = z2)])
Test-IC-3 Algorithm-2 (Complete): (∀x1∀y1∀z1)(¬de-
Using IC-4 to generate the support test
IC-4: (∀t∀u∀v∀w∃x∃y∃z)(emp(t, u, v, w) → dept(u, x, y, z)),
Step 2. OIC CA = {u}.
Step 3. θ = {u/a, x/b, y/c, z/d}.
Step 4. α = {u/a}.
Step 5. σ = θ ∩ α = {u/a}.
Step 6. Apply σ to IC-4, ¬emp(t, a, v, w) ∨ dept(a, x, y, z) ).
Step 7. Apply the absorption rules, / * dept(a, x, y, z) = false * / (∀t∀v∀w) (¬emp(t, a, v, w ¬emp(t, a, v, w) ).
Step 8. Negate W , (∃t∃v∃w) (emp(t, a, v, w) ). emp(t,  a, v, w) ).
Test-IC-3 Algorithm-3 (Support): (∃t∃v∃w)(

IC-4:
Update operation: insert emp(a, b, c, d) Test-IC-4 Algorithm-1 (Complete): (∃x∃y∃z)(dept (b, x, y, z)).
Test-IC-4 Algorithm-2 (Sufficient): (∃t∃v∃w)(emp (t, b, v, w)).
Using IC-6 to generate the support test
Step
Step 2. OIC CA = {v}.
Step 4. α = {v/b}.
Step 5. σ = θ ∩ α = {v/b}.
Step 6. Apply σ to IC-6,
Step 7. Apply the absorption rules, / * dept(b, ¬proj (u, b, w) ).
Step 8. Negate W , (∃u∃w) (proj (u, b, w) ). t, a, v, w) ).
Test-IC-4 Algorithm-3 (Support): (∃u∃w)(proj (u, b, w)).
IC-4:
Step 3. θ = {v/a, x/b, y/c, z/d}.
Step 4. α = {v/a}.
Step 5. σ = θ ∩ α = {v/a}.
Step 6. Apply σ to IC-6, ¬proj (u, a, w) ∨ dept(a, x, y, z) ).
Step 7. Apply the absorption rules, / * dept(a, x, y, z) = false * / (∀u∀w) (¬proj (u, a, w) ∨ false) ¬proj (u, a, w) ).
Using IC-5 to generate the support test
(∀u∀v∀w∃x∃y∃z)(¬proj (u, v, w) ∨ emp(u, x, y, z)).
Step 6. Apply σ to IC-5,
Step 7. Apply the absorption rules, / * ¬proj (a, v, emp(a, x, y, z) ), Table 2 summarizes the integrity tests generated for the integrity constraints listed in Section 3.
Performance Analysis
We have conducted three experiments. The first experiment aims at analyzing the performance of the checking mechanisms with respect to the amount of data transferred across the network for the update operation when various combinations of integrity tests are selected, as follows. ¬emp(a, x1, y1, z1) ) Complete Test 4. (∃v∃w)(proj (a, v, w) ) Support Test 5. (∃t∃u∃w)(dept(t, u, a, w) ) ¬dept(a, x1, y1, z1) ) Complete Test 8. (∃t∃v∃w)(emp(t, a, v, w) ) Support Test 9. (∃u∃w)(proj (u, a, w) )
IC : the initial integrity constraints are checked to identify the existence of inconsistency in the distributed database. This method is termed the brute force checking.
CT : only the complete tests are selected. CT/ST : either the complete test or the sufficient test is selected depending on which test will minimize the amount of data transferred, for a given integrity constraint. This approach is as proposed by previous studies [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 10, 12] . CT/ST/SupT : either the complete test, or the sufficient test, or the support test is selected, depending on which test will minimize the amount of data transferred and the number of sites involved, for a given integrity constraint. This is what we proposed. Focus is given on the amount of data transferred across the network since it is the most critical factor that influences the performance of the checking mechanisms, as highlighted in the literature.
The second experiment aims at comparing the above strategies with respect to the cost of checking the constraints, and it is defined by the following formula:
where n is the number of tests selected to be evaluated and i means the i-th test to be evaluated. T provides an estimate of the amount of data transferred across the network. It is measured based on the following formula, T = n i=1 dt i , where dt i is the amount of data transferred from site i to the target site. A í provides an estimate of the amount of data accessed, which is related to the number and the size of relations specified in a given constraint or integrity tests, IC. This measurement indirectly indicates the size of the checking space. It is based on the following formula, A IC (R1,R2,...,Rn) = δR 1 + δR 2 + . . . + δR n where the R i 's are the relation specified in IC, and δR i is the size of R i .
Note that although it is known that the amount of data transferred across the network is the most critical factor, but for this experiment we assume that both are critical and thus no weight is given. Cost indirectly determines the time taken to check the consistency of the distributed databases.
The third experiment aims at analyzing the constraint checking process in terms of percentage of local processing when various combinations of integrity tests are selected.
For each experiment above, we consider the worst case scenario where the emp, dept and proj relations are located at three different sites, S1, S2 and S3, respectively. We assume that there are 500 employees (500 tuples), 10 departments (10 tuples), and 100 projects (100 tuples). Also assume that the following update operations are submitted by three different users at three different sites.
(a) A user A submits an insert operation, insert emp(E1, D4, J5, 4500) at S1.
(b) A user B submits an insert operation, insert emp(E2, D4, J6, 3000) at S2.
(c) A user C submits an insert operation, insert emp(E3, D3, J5, 4500) at S3.
Result of Experiment 1
The performance of the checking mechanism with respect to the amount of data transferred across the network for the update operations (a), (b) and (c) discussed above when various combinations of integrity tests are selected is as illustrated below. Fig.3 shows that the amount of data transferred across the network for update (a) is reduced for all the constraints (IC-1, IC-2, IC-4, and IC-10) even though only the complete test is selected and it is further reduced when both the complete and sufficient tests are considered. For this case, no data is being transferred, i.e., the integrity tests selected can be evaluated at the target site and the number of sites involved is 1. Note also, this case represents the assumption made by the previous researches where the update operation is submitted at the site where the relation is located. Hence, for the update operation (a), integrity tests 1, 2, 11, and 33 should be selected. when the complete test is considered. The amount of data transferred for IC-2 is the same for the initial constraint, complete, and sufficient tests. But this is further reduced when the support test is considered. For this case, no data is being transferred, i.e., the integrity tests selected can be evaluated at the target site and the number of sites involved is 1. Hence, for the update operation (b), integrity tests 1, 5, 10, and 32 should be selected. 5 shows that the amount of data transferred across the network for update operation (c) is reduced for most of the constraints (IC-1, IC-4 , and IC-10) when the complete tests are considered. The amount of data transferred is still the same even when both the complete and sufficient tests are being considered. But this is further reduced when the support test is considered. For this case, no data is being transferred, i.e., the integrity tests selected can be evaluated at the target site for IC-1, IC-2 and IC-4 , and the number of sites involved is 1. Hence, for the update operation (c), integrity tests 1, 4, 12, and 32 should be selected. From the analysis, it is clear that local checking can be achieved by not only selecting sufficient test as suggested by previous studies [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] 12] but also by evaluating the sufficient, complete or support tests depending on the information that is available at the target site. We have also showed that complete, sufficient and support tests can be local or global tests depending on where the update operation is submitted and the location of the relation(s) specified in the integrity tests. Most importantly, we have proved that, in some cases, support tests can benefit the distributed database, as shown by update operation (b) with test 5 (IC-2) and update operation (c) with tests 4 (IC-2) and 12 (IC-4), where local constraint checking can be achieved.
Result of Experiment 2
Fig .6 presents the cost of checking the constraints for the update operations (a), (b), and (c) discussed above when various combinations of integrity tests are selected. The cost is measured based on the formula given earlier. It is obvious that the CT/ST/SupT strategy proposed by us has the lowest cost for both update operations (b) and (c) compared to the other three strategies. This is due to the fact that most of the process of checking the consistency of the distributed database is performed at the local site, i.e., at the site where the update is executed. Thus, on average the Cost = A since T ≈ 0. Nevertheless, our strategy has the same Cost as CT/ST for update operation (a) and CT is the best strategy. Although our strategy managed to increase the number of local processing (T ≈ 0) but for update operation (a) the amount of data accessed by CT/ST/SupT is bigger than the amount of data transferred across the network by CT. However, we believe that CT/ST/SupT is better than CT if weight is considered in measuring Cost. The brute force strategy, IC, shows that it is the worst strategy for update operations (a), (b), and (c). 
Result of Experiment 3
Fig .7 shows the constraint checking process with various strategies for the update operations (a), (b), and (c) discussed above. It is clear that the CT/ST/SupT strategy proposed by us has the highest percentage of local tests for both update operations (b) and (c) compared to the other three strategies due to all (for this example) the tests can be checked locally. However our strategy has the same ratio as CT/ST for update operation (a). 
Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed an approach that performs constraint checking at the target site by utilizing as much as possible the local information to avoid the possibility of transferring data across the network. The novelty of this approach is that local checking can be performed regardless the location of the submitted update operation. This is achieved by having several types of integrity tests and not focusing on certain type of integrity tests as suggested by previous researchers in this area. The cost which indirectly indicates the time taken to check the consistency of distributed databases is reduced. Most importantly, we have proved that, in most cases, support tests can benefit the distributed database, where local constraint checking can be achieved. Thus, the efficiency of checking constraint process is increased.
For future work further enhancement to the proposed approach can be done by considering strategies to maintain the distributed database state when violation occurs. Considering multiple operations or transaction is another area that can be explored where strategies that can minimize the cost of checking the constraints are needed.
